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Abstract—Mining is a central operation of all proof-of-work
(PoW) based cryptocurrencies. The vast majority of miners today
participate in “mining pools” instead of “solo mining” in order
to lower risk and achieve a more steady income. However,
this rise of participation in mining pools negatively affects the
decentralization levels of most cryptocurrencies.
In this work, we look into mining pools from the point of
view of a miner: We present an analytical model and implement a
computational tool that allows miners to optimally distribute their
computational power over multiple pools and PoW cryptocur-
rencies (i.e. build a mining portfolio), taking into account their
risk aversion levels. Our tool allows miners to maximize their
risk-adjusted earnings by diversifying across multiple mining
pools which enhances PoW decentralization. Finally, we run
an experiment in Bitcoin historical data and demonstrate that
a miner diversifying over multiple pools, as instructed by our
model/tool, receives a higher overall Sharpe ratio (i.e. average
excess reward over its standard deviation/volatility).
I. INTRODUCTION
The majority of cryptocurrencies use some type of proof-
of-work (PoW) based consensus mechanism to order and
finalize transactions stored in the blockchain. At any given
time, a set of users all over the world (called miners or
maintainers) compete in solving a PoW puzzle that will allow
them to post the next block in the blockchain and at the
same time claim the “coinbase” reward and any relevant
transaction fees. In the early years of cryptocurrencies solo
mining was the norm, and a miner using his own hardware
would attempt to solve the PoW puzzle himself, earning the
reward. However, as the exchange rate of cryptocurrencies
increased, the PoW competition become fiercer, specialized
hardware was manufactured just for the purpose of mining
particular types of PoW (e.g. Bitcoin or Ethereum mining
ASICs [1]), and eventually users formed coalitions for better
chances of solving the puzzle.
These coalitions known as mining pools, where miners
are all continuously trying to mine a block with the “pool
manager” being the reward recipient, enabled participating
users to reduce their mining risks1. After the establishment of
mining pools, it become nearly impossible for “solo” miners
to compete on the mining game, even if they were using
specialized hardware, or else they could risk not to earn any
rewards at all during the hardware’s lifetime.
The selection of a mining pool is not a trivial task. A large
number of pools exist each offering different reward distribu-
1We measure a miner’s “risk” by the variance of rewards over time.
tion methods and earning fees (as we further discuss in Section
II-B). At the same time different pools control a different ratio
of the overall hashrate consumed by a cryptocurrency and
larger pools (in terms of hashrate) offer lower risk, as they
typically offer more frequent payouts to the miners. But how
can a miner make an optimal decision about which mining
pools to participate in and for which cryptocurrencies at any
given time considering the variety of possible options?
Our contributions. We present an analytical tool that
allows risk-averse miners to optimally create a mining portfolio
that maximizes their risk-adjusted rewards. We characterize
miners by their total computational resources (i.e. hash power)
and their risk aversion level, and mining pools by their total
computational power (i.e. hash rate) and the reward mechanism
they offer. We model the hash rate allocation as an optimization
problem that aims to maximize the miner’s expected utility.
In Section III, we provide three different versions of our
model. The first one, inspired by [2], concerns a miner that
wishes to mine on a single cryptocurrency, while aiming
to diversify among any number of mining pools (including
the solo mining option). The second version captures miners
which diversify across different cryptocurrencies that use the
same PoW mining algorithm. In our third version, we model
miners who also wish to diversify across cryptocurrencies with
different PoW mining algorithms. Our modeling technique
is based on standard utility maximization, and extends the
Markowitz Modern portfolio theory [3] to multiple mining
pools, rather than multiple assets.
In Section IV we present an implementation of our model.
We develop a Python tool that uses the constrained opti-
mization by linear approximation (COBYLA) [4] method to
automate the pool distribution for an active miner. A miner can
use our tool by providing as input its own mining power (for
any PoW type) as well as his risk aversion rate and any number
of pools he wishes to take into account when computing the
optimal distribution of his mining power. As expected, we
observe that for “reasonable” values of risk aversion level, the
miner would generally allocate more of his resources to pools
offering large hash power combined with small fees, without
however neglecting other pools that are not as “lucrative”.
Finally, to illustrate the usefulness of our tool, we run an
experiment on Bitcoin historical data (Section V). We start by
considering a Bitcoin miner who starts mining passively on a
single chosen pool for 4 months and compute his earnings on
a daily basis.
Then, we consider a miner with the same hash power who
using our tool, would “actively” diversify every 3 days over
3 Bitcoin pools and reallocate his hash power accordingly. In
our experiment we observe that the “active” miner improves
his reward over risk ratio (Sharpe ratio [5]) by 260% compared
to the “passive” miner. In our experiments, for the “passive”
miner we picked a large and reputable pool (Slush pool) while
for the “active” miner we added one more pool of equivalent
size and fee structure (ViaBTC), as well as a lower-fee smaller
pool (DPool) for a better illustration. Note that there are several
degrees of freedom in our experiments (i,e., time periods, set
of pools selected etc.). Thus, we include replications with
different parameters (time period, pools, risk aversion, miners
power and frequency of diversification) to show how each one
of them can affect the end result.
Related Work. There exist a few running tools which on
input a miner’s hashing power suggest which cryptocurrency
is currently most profitable. For instance, tools like Mul-
tipoolminer [6], Smartmine [7] or Minergate [8] start by
benchmarking the CPU/GPU of the miner, (which we consider
an orthogonal service to the third version of our model)
and then suggest a cryptocurrency which would offer the
best reward at that time. To make that decision, they look
into various cryptocurrencies’ parameters (i.e. block time,
reward etc.) and the current difficulty (their exact model is
unclear). Which pools the miner will use towards mining the
suggested cryptocurrency is either hard-coded by the tool, or
chosen by the miner. Our method differs from such tools
in various aspects. Most importantly, in our model we take
the risk aversion rate of the miner into account, which is an
important factor when making financial decisions. Moreover,
we focus on allocating a miner’s power over multiple pools, as
opposed to just different cryptocurrencies, which can benefit
the decentralization within a cryptocurrency.
Miner’s risk aversion was taken into account by Fisch
et al [9] who provided a top-down (from pool’s point of
view) analysis, i.e. focused on optimal pool operation strategies
towards maximizing the pool’s expected utility. Cong et al. [2]
also took risk aversion into account in their modeling, however
the focus of their work was different from ours. In particular,
they focus on the interaction between miners and pools. They
first demonstrate the significant risk-diversification benefit of-
fered by mining pools for individual miners, highlighting risk-
sharing as a natural centralizing force. Then, they demon-
strate that the risk-sharing benefit within a large pool could
be alternatively obtained through miner diversification across
multiple small pools. Finally, they present an equilibrium
model where multiple pool managers compete in fees to attract
customer miners. In our work, we focus on the miners’ side: we
develop tools to help miners diversify among different pools
and cryptocurrencies to maximize their risk-adjusted earnings.
Because we emphasize on hash rate allocations across
multiple mining pools, either within the same or over different
cryptocurrencies, our analysis distinguishes from contempo-
rary works such as [10], who present an economic model of
hash power allocation over different cryptocurrencies sharing
the same PoW algorithm in a Markowitz fashion. This per-
spective also sets us apart from [11] who study mining across
different currencies in a strategic fashion, without accounting
for pooled mining.
Finally, some recent works examined the case where miners
change the mining pool they mine with, in order to optimize
their rewards from a network performance scope (communi-
cations delay). Y.Lewenberg et al. [12] showed how network
delays incentivize miners to switch among pools in order to op-
timize their payoffs due to the non-linearity introduced. X.Liu
et al. [13] discussed how to dynamically select a mining pool
taking into account the pool’s computation power (hash rate)
and the network’s propagation delay. Network performance is
an important aspect when diversifying across pools, and we
view [12], [13] as complementary to our work.
II. MINING BACKGROUND
As of today, the majority of blockchain-based cryptocur-
rencies use PoW for maintaining their ledger. Miners listen
the network for (a) pending transactions and (b) new blocks
of transactions to be posted on the ledger. The role of a miner
is to select a subset of pending transactions, assemble them to
a new block and perform computational work towards finding
a random nonce r that will make the block valid and allow the
miner to append it on the blockchain and thus win the reward.
The brute-forcing process of finding a suitable nonce r such
that together with the rest of the block contents b satisfies
the property H(b||r) < T for some target value T is called
“mining”. For Bitcoin, this translates to finding a suitable hash
pre-image using the double SHA256 hash function.
Note that, although solving PoW puzzles was initially done
using ordinary CPUs, the increasing prices of cryptocurrencies
have resulted in a “hardware race” to develop the most efficient
mining hardware using Application Specific Integrated Circuits
(ASICs), designed to perform SHA256 hashing operations in
many orders of magnitude faster than CPUs or GPUs.
A. Mining Pools
Mining is a random process, in most cryptocurrencies the
computational power devoted to solve the PoW puzzle is very
high, which implies a high variance on the miner’s reward. In
Bitcoin, even for a miner using state of the art ASICs, there
is a good probability that he never gets a block mined during
the hardware’s lifetime. This led to the formation of mining
pools, where coalitions of miners are all continuously trying
to mine a block, with the “pool manager” being the reward
recipient. If any of the participating miners finds a solution to
the PoW puzzle, the pool manager receives the block reward
R and distributes to the participants, while possibly keeping a
small cut (or fee f). The block reward R distribution is based
on how much work these miners performed. A method for
the pool manager to measure how much effort each miner has
put into the pool is by keeping a record of shares, which are
“near-solutions” to the PoW puzzle (or “near-valid” blocks),
satisfying the property Ts < H(b||r) < T where Ts is the
“share difficulty”. There are several methods to distribute the
reward R to the miners, which we analyze below.
B. Reward Methods in Mining Pools
Different pools offer slightly different reward methods (or
a mix of them), with the most popular being: pay per share
(PPS), Proportional, and pay per last N shares (PPLNS).
In the PPS reward method, the miners are not immediately
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TABLE I. NOTATION
Total number of pools M
Hashrate and fee of pool m Λm ,fm
Transaction fee tx
Miner’s hashing power allocated to pool m
(and cryptocurrency c) λm(λm,c)
Miner’s total hashing power
(for mining algorithm α) λA(λα )
Constant Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA) ρ
Cryptocurrency c total hashrate Λc
Block time and block reward of cryptocurrency c Dc ,Rc
Total number of cryprocurrencies C
Total number of PoW mining algorithms A
(Average) network difficulty T
Cryptocurrency exchange rate Ec
Number of blocks found on a day d Bd
Diversification interval (days) t
Sharpe ratio, Total accumulated reward/payoff S,P
paid when a block is found, however each block reward is
deposited into a “central pool fund” or “bucket”. The miners
are paid proportionally to the shares submitted throughout
their participation in the pool, regardless of if and when
the pool has found a solution to the PoW puzzle. PPS is
generally considered to offer a steady, almost guaranteed
income, independent of the pool’s “luck” finding a block. In
the proportional reward method, whenever a pool solves the
puzzle for a new block, the new block reward is distributed
to the pool’s miners proportionally to the number of shares
each miner has submitted to the pool for that particular block.
This method however was found to be vulnerable to the “pool-
hopping” attack, where the miners could exploit the pool’s
expected earnings, variance and maturity time and “hop away”
to another pool or solo-mining when the pool’s attractiveness is
low [14]. The PPLNS method was implemented to counter this
attack, where the miners’ reward is distributed according to the
“recent” number of submitted shares, thus invalidating shares
submitted early. As shown in Appendix A, the PPLNS method
in mining pools is the most popular reward method today.
In addition, many other PPLNS variants are currently being
used by mining pools, e.g the RBPPS (Round Based Pay Per
Share) method where the pool only pays the reward after the
block eventually gets confirmed by the network (thus excluding
deprecated blocks). We refer the reader to [15] and [14] for
thorough and complete analysis of pool reward methods. In our
setting, we mostly consider pools that offer a PPLNS reward
method (or its variants). We generally do not consider pools
that use the PPS method, as the miners’ expected earnings do
not depend on the variance of finding blocks.
Mining pools offering multiple reward methods. As mentioned
above, some mining pools offer multiple reward systems (i.e.
the Coinotron pool [16] offers both PPS and PPLNS). We study
these types of pools separately, as some miners might opt for
different fee contracts within the same pool.
Let a mining pool m with total hashrate Λm, offering both
PPLNS and PPS reward systems to choose from, where z is
the percentage of pool’s hashing power paid using a PPLNS
fee contract, and (1−z) is the percentage paid using a PPS fee
contract. Also let λm be a miner’s hashing power allocated to
poolm and Rλm the miner’s reward when a block is eventually
mined by the pool bringing a total reward R.
The pool manager should make sure to keep paying its
PPS miners at a steady rate, compensating for any pool “luck”
fluctuations in any given period when trying to find a block.
To achieve this, the manager needs to maintain a “bucket”
containing an adequate amount of coins, and keep replenishing
it with RPPS (i.e. reward of PPS) each time a block is “mined”
by the pool with block reward R, to keep paying PPS miners
during periods of bad “luck”. Consequently, when the pool
collectively “mines” a block with reward R, the pool manager
can select one of the following three miner payment strategies,
which also determine the exact PPLNS miners’ reward:
Strategy 1: The pool manager splits R into RPPS = (1−z)R
and RPPLNS = zR. By this strategy, Rλm =
λm
zΛm
zR = R λmΛm .
In other words, the miner having contributed a hashrate of
λm will get a reward based on the percent of the hashrate he
contributed with respect to the total hashrate of PPLNS miners,
multiplied by RPPLNS (i.e. reward of PPLNS).
Strategy 2: The pool manager pays the PPLNS miners based
on the total hashrate of the pool Λm, then allocate the
remainder of the rewards to the PPS bucket. By this strategy,
Rλm = R
λm
Λm
which effectively results to the same paid
amount as in Strategy 1.
Strategy 3: First replenish the PPS “bucket” based on the total
amount R˜ was paid off to the PPS miners since the last block
was found, then pay PPLNS based on what is left of the total
reward. Following this strategy: RPPLNS = R −R˜ and miner’s
reward is Rλm = RPPLNS
λm
zΛm
= (R−R˜) λm
zΛm
. Effectively, the
pool manager by this strategy transfers some of his risk to the
PPLNS miners.
To our knowledge, no mining pool that offers both PPLNS
and PPS reward systems specifies which strategy it follows.
Using public data to prove which strategy a mining pool
follows is a non-trivial process. We assume that pools offering
both PPS and PPLNS reward mechanisms follow either Strat-
egy 1 or 2 which are the most intuitive and produce the same
end result for the miners.
III. ACTIVE MINER’S PROBLEM
Our model builds on the recent study of [2], which con-
siders the problem of an “active” miner, who given a set of
M mining pools, where each pool m has a total hashrate Λm,
and fee fm, wishes to maximize his expected utility, or the
weighted average of his expected earnings. In [2] the miner’s
utility is quantified based on the available pools’ parameters
and his Constant-Absolute-Risk-Aversion (CARA) ρ, as well
as his own available hashing power and the expected reward
value. We describe this model (which serves as the base of our
schemes) in Section III-A.
A. Mining on a Single Cryptocurrency
We consider an active miner, who owns mining hardware
with PoW hashing power λA and is mining on a single
cryptocurrency with total hashrate Λ. Ideally he would like to
distribute λA amongM mining pools of different sizes offering
different fee structures (while possibly keeping a portion of his
power for zero-fee solo mining) in a way that maximizes his
expected utility. Doing so is not trivial, as mining pools differ
widely in their size and service fees, and in many cases there
is no correlation between these two attributes.
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A first attempt was done in [2] where the authors intro-
duced an analytical utility function to capture miners’ risk
aversion when considering mining pools offering a PPLNS
reward method. The idea is to express the expected utility of
pool-mining, in terms of a miner’s PoW hash power λA, pools’
hashrates Λm, pools’ fees fm, a CARA value ρ chosen by
the miner and block reward R. The CARA value essentially
quantifies how risk averse a miner is, where ρ = 0 means that
the miner is risk neutral. The expected utility is calculated
by Equation 1, where an active miner should find the vector
{λm}
M
m=1 maximizing his utility value. This vector expresses
an allocation of his mining power λA over M different pools,
where λm denotes the mining power allocated to pool m:
M∑
m=1
(λm + Λm)(1− e
−ρR(1−fm)
λm
λm+Λm )+
(λA −
M∑
m=1
λm)(1− e
−ρR) (1)
under constraints:
M∑
m=1
λm ≤ λA and λm ≥ 0, ∀m ∈M.
By solving this optimization problem, we are given the
optimal distribution of the miner’s total hashpower λA to M
pools. Note that the second term of Equation 1 expresses the
left-over hashpower for the miner to mine “solo”. If the miner
is risk-neutral (i.e. ρ = 0), solo mining (which has a zero fee)
is the optimal solution.
The reasoning behind this model is that the total payoff P
of a miner, who has allocated his resources as above, is equal
to the weighted sum of each pool’s expected reward, with the
weights being the miner’s hash rate percentage in the pool, plus
the expected reward from solo mining, which is expressed as:
P =
M∑
m=1
λm
λm + Λm
RN˜pool,m +RN˜solo (2)
where N˜pool,m ∼ Poisson(
λm+Λm
Λ ) and N˜solo ∼
Poisson(λsoloΛ ). The miner’s expected utility u(·) is:
u(·) = E[−e−ρP] (3)
Notice that for a Poisson distributed variable x with parameter
λ, its moment generating function E[ewx] for any parameter
w, is given by eλ(e
w
−1). Now from Equations 2 and 3 we can
derive Equation 1. A similar reasoning applies to the rest of
our models presented below.
B. Allowing Selection of PPS pools
The problem with the model of Eq. 1 is that it restricts
the miners to choose between pools that only offer the PPLNS
reward method. Below, we provide a model that allows miners
to choose mining pools also offering PPS reward systems. In
this case, a rational miner will choose to add only the PPS pool
that offers the smaller fee, and disregard pools with higher PPS
fees. Eq. 1 is then transformed as follows (changes denoted in
blue color):
M∑
m=1
(λm + Λm)(1 − e
−ρR(1−fm)
λm
λm+Λm )
+(λA−λPPS −
M∑
m=1
λm)(1 − e
−ρR)+λPPS(1− fPPS)ρR (4)
under constraints:
M∑
m=1
λm+λPPS ≤ λA, λm ≥ 0, ∀m ∈M,
and λPPS ≥ 0.
The logic behind this model, similar to our basic single-
cryptocurrency model, is that when assuming a miner who is
willing to allocate his mining power towards PPS/PPLNS pools
and solo-mining, we add to his total payoff P a constant reward
amount proportionate to the power allocated to the PPS pool
over the total cryptocurrency’s hashpower, minus the pool’s
fee, expressed as follows:
P =
M∑
m=1
λm
λm + Λm
(1− fPPS)RN˜pool,m+
RN˜solo +R
λPPS(1 − fPPS)
Λ
(5)
From Equations 5 and 3 we derive Equation 4, where the last
term λPPS(1 − fPPS)ρR expresses a steady income from the
PPS pool.
C. Mining Across Multiple Cryptocurrencies
We now consider a miner who owns mining hardware with
PoW hash power λA and wants to maximize his “risk-sharing
benefit” value by mining over C different cryptocurrencies and
M pools in total, provided that each cryptocurrency c ∈ C
uses the same PoW mining algorithm α. The allocation of the
miner’s hashing power λA will now be {λm,c}
M
m=1, c ∈ C and
the first constraint in Equation 1 takes the form:
∑
c∈C
M∑
m=1
λm,c ≤ λA.
However, each cryptocurrency c has its own block reward
Rc
2 and its own average block timeDc. Thus, we also consider
the reward over time ratio Rc
Dc
, as it effectively normalizes Rc
over different cryptocurrencies. In addition, a miner’s hashrate
λm allocated to pool m that mines cryptocurrency c should be
normalized to each cryptocurrency’s total hashrate Λc. So, in
this (more general) case, Equation 1 takes the following form,
under the new constraints outlined above:
∑
c∈C
(
M∑
m=1
(λm,c + Λm,c)
DcΛc
(1− e
−ρRc(1−fm,c)
λm,c
λm,c+Λm,c )
+
λ0,c
DcΛc
(1− e−ρRc)
)
(6)
2We should be careful to express Rc in a fiat currency value (e.g. USD),
as we do not take different cryptocurrency exchange rates into consideration.
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where λ0,c denotes solo mining for cryptocurrency c, and the
first constraint of Equation 1 is more precisely expressed as
∑
c∈C
(
M∑
m=1
λm,c + λ0,c
)
≤ λA.
The above constraint shows that the miner could choose to
diversify his solo-mining (which was initially expressed by the
second term in Equation 1) over multiple currencies as well,
in a similar fashion as he would do by diversifying across
multiple mining pools.
D. Mining Across Cryptocurrencies with Different PoW Algo-
rithms
In the previous sections we assumed that the active miner’s
goal is to maximize his “risk-sharing benefit” value, given that
he mines on one or more different cryptocurrencies using the
same PoW algorithm. We now generalize our consideration,
by allowing a miner to distribute his power across C different
cryptocurrencies, and across A different PoW algorithms3.
Let A be the set of PoW algorithms. Since each algorithm
solves a different version of the PoW puzzle, and uses a
different set of hash functions, the miner’s “total” hashrate
λαi for each algorithm αi will change. However the miner
might choose to allocate his hardware “power” among different
mining PoW puzzles at the same time (in CPU mining, that
would require setting priority levels to each Operating System
process i). In this case, we can use Equation 6, but its first
constraint will become
∑
αi∈A
∑
c∈C
M∑
m=1
λm,c
λαi
≤ 1.
Example: Assume a miner who owns some amount of
computational power (CPUs and/or GPUs). With his hardware,
he could mine exclusively cryptocurrency c1 which uses PoW
mining algorithm α1, and his maximum hashrate would be
λα1 . Alternatively, he could mine exclusively coin c2 which
uses PoW mining algorithm α2, at a hashing rate of λα2 . Now
he wishes to diversify his risk among these two cryptocurren-
cies (for simplicity we assume that he chooses to mine them
only on a single pool each). The resulting constraint would be
λ1,1
λα1
+
λ2,2
λα2
≤ 1.
Each term represents the “percentage” of the miner’s CPU
(and/or GPU) power devoted to mining on a specific PoW
algorithm. The sum of the ratios cannot exceed 1 which
represents the total CPU and/or GPU power of the hardware4.
3This of course assumes that the miner owns CPU/GPU mining hardware,
since ASICs are restricted to specific PoW algorithms.
4In our assumption we do not take a “dual mining” GPU setup into
account.
E. Transaction Fees in Mining Pools
In the early days of cryptocurrencies, transaction fees were
negligible compared to block rewards. However during recent
periods, transaction fees have risen to considerable amounts,
especially in the case of Bitcoin [17]. It is up to the pool
manager to decide if the transaction fees are distributed to
the participating miners or is kept by the pool for profit.
However, especially during periods of high transaction fees,
not including these fees to the miners’ rewardR can be thought
intuitively as a “hidden fee”. Let txc the average transaction
fee for cryptocurrency c observed during a recent period of
time. Also we set txm,c = 1 if the pool pays transaction fees
to the miner, else we set txm,c = 0. We modify Equation 6 to
include (non-negligible) transaction fees as follows (changes
denoted in color, the equations for other cases can be modified
in a similar way):
∑
c∈C
(
M∑
m=1
(λm,c + Λm,c)
DcΛc
(1− e
−ρ(Rc+txctxm,c)(1−fm,c)
λm,c
λm,c+Λm,c )
+
λ0,c
DcΛc
(1− e−ρ(Rc+txctxm,c))
)
. (7)
IV. IMPLEMENTATION OF OUR MODEL
In this Section we present an implementation of our min-
ing resources allocation mechanism. We developed a Python
tool that automates the decision for an active miner, who
owns either commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) hardware (e.g.
CPUs/GPUs) or application-specific integrated circuit hard-
ware (ASICs) 5. Our tool covers all the cases discussed in
Section III.
Choosing the Right Optimization Method: In order to find
the best possible allocation of the miner’s hash power we tried
a few optimization methods. First, we applied the sequential
least squares programming algorithm (SLSQP), which uses
the Han-Powell quasi-newton method with a BFGS update
of the B-matrix and an L1-test function for the steplength
algorithm [18]. Second, we implemented a modification of
Newton’s method that solves the Lagrange system of equations
for the active constraints. To our surprise both mentioned
gradient based optimization methods experienced difficulties
in obtaining accurate solutions to the optimization problem for
very small values of ρ, about 10−5. A possible explanation to
that phenomenon is that the instances with a wide range of
hashes/sec from a few to quintillion 1018, make the gradients
calculated with significant computational errors. The presence
of exponential functions sensitive to the scale of their argument
is a contributing factor for the loss of the accuracy for
the obtained gradients under the finite precision computer
arithmetic. Even though those methods could be used for the
cases with larger values of ρ, we abandoned them.
The most successful algorithm for the optimization prob-
lem was the constrained optimization by linear approximation
(COBYLA) [4]. COBYLA was developed for solving non-
linear constrained optimization problems via a sequence of
linear programming subproblems, each solved on an updated
simplex. COBYLA is a good fit for our optimization problem
5The latest version of our tool can be accessed at http://smart-miner.com
5
for the following reasons. First, our feasible set is a simplex,
so the vertices of the feasible set form a good initial linear
approximation. Second, our problem is low dimensional (no
more than a dozen of variables). The low dimensionality of
the problem results in a relatively small number of simplexes
that need to be constructed before the solutions is found.
Finally, COBYLA is a gradient free algorithm. Therefore
to update iterates, COBYLA does not rely on the gradient
obtained locally in one point, which may be not accurate
for this problem. Instead, in its search COBYLA relies on
the slope of a linear n-dimensional approximation calculated
out of readily available n+1 feasible points. We believe that
all these factors together contribute to the efficiency of the
algorithm for finding the best possible allocation of the miner’s
hash power. Therefore, our tool utilizes COBYLA optimization
solving method.
Description and Instantiation Assumptions: The basic sin-
gle - cryptocurrency version of our tool, given as input the
miner’s hashing power λA, coin’s exchange rate E, chosen
pool data [Λi, fi]
M
i=1 (pool total hashrate and fee respectively)
and risk aversion ρ, outputs the optimal distribution of his
hashpower over these pools plus a “solo-mining” remainder.
Some instantiations of our tool are outlined in Section IV-A as
examples for a typical value range of ρ. Our tool can also pro-
vide the optimal distribution for the “multi-cryptocurrency, sin-
gle PoW algorithm” (Section III-C) and “multi-cryptocurrency,
multi-PoW algorithm” (Section III-D) extensions, and we also
outline an extended instantiation in Section IV-B.
The results of our tool can be easily applied for mining
in large-scale, where a miner can allocate a portion of his
hardware to mine on a specific pool. The process of applying
the results on a single mining hardware piece is not trivial,
as to our knowledge, no ASIC or GPU miner application
exists that enables the user to allocate his mining power over
many pools by a specific percentage, even if theoretically
it’s technically feasible. The majority of ASICs utilize a fork
of the cgminer tool, which initially offered a “multipool
strategy” option for the miner, but was later deprecated as
it was no longer compatible with the modern stratum mining
protocol [19]. Multi-pool mining in a round-robin fashion is
not efficient for the miner as well, as this would result to
a decrease in his overall reward, given the nature of reward
schemes that prevent pool “hopping”. We encourage ASIC
manufacturers and mining application developers to enable
user-specified multi-pool mining in future releases, for the
benefit of the miners and the whole community.
We assume that the miner possess an average wealth of W
= $100k, while having typical values for the constant relative
risk aversion CRRA metric between 1 and 10 [20]. Given that
CARA = CRRA/W , we take as typical values for CARA ρ
between 10−5−10−4, which we mostly assume throughout the
rest of this paper. Note that changing our assumption for our
miner’s wealth is equivalent to changing the typical value range
for ρ accordingly (we include additional evaluation analysis for
a broader range of ρ values).
A. Single Cryptocurrency
1) Evaluation I: We instantiate the first experiment of our
tool by using the following parameters: a miner with total
TABLE II. EVALUATION I POOL PARAMETERS.
Pool 1 Λ1 10
6 hashes/sec
f1 2%
Pool 2 Λ2 10
5 hashes/sec
f2 2%
Pool 3 Λ3 10
4 hashes/sec
f3 1%
Pool 4 Λ4 10
3 hashes/sec
f4 0%
0.00002 0.00004 0.00006 0.00008 0.00010
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Fig. 1. Single cryptocurrency diversification.
hashpower λA = 40 hashes/sec, wishing to mine on a single
cryptocurrency with block reward R = $50000, having picked
4 mining pools with parameters shown in Table II: These
values do not correspond to “real” mining pools (or an existing
cryptocurrency), but are representatives for different classes of
pools in terms of relative size, as larger real-world pools charge
higher fees (but have less fluctuations on the miner’s income)
while smaller pools have lower (or even zero) fees to attract
new miners to them. The results depicted on Figure 1 show that
our model produces the expected choices for rational miners.
For smaller values of ρ the miner is willing to “risk” more, and
would dedicate much of his hashpower to the small Pool 4, but
for larger values of ρ the miner would diversify among larger
pools for a steadier income. Another important observation
is that for ρ > 6 · 10−5 the miner would allocate some of
his power at both Pools 1 and 2 to diversify his risk (which
are the “largest” pools, having the same 2% fee), although he
would show a strong preference for Pool 1 which is 10 times
larger than Pool 2. Note that for simplicity, we do not take any
transaction fees kept by pools into account, however using the
methodology discussed in Section III-E our evaluation would
produce equivalent results.
2) Evaluation II: We then pick some actual Bitcoin pools:
Slush pool, ViaBTC and KanoPool. These pools, as indicated
by their parameters shown in Table III (values as of February
2019) are representatives of the options available to a miner, as
they cover a wide range of pool hash-power Λm and pool fee
fm. The above pools use either PPLNS or Score (variant of
proportional) reward methods. We do not include a PPS pool
in this example, although taken into account in Equation 4, as
the results turned out to be identical for the typical value range
of ρ. Using our parameters, a PPS pool would participate in the
diversification only for large values of ρ that are not within the
typical range (we show such an example later in this section).
For the other parameters, we consider a large-scale miner who
owns total mining power of λA = 3000 TH/sec (roughly about
100 units of Antminer S15 ASICs), and the Bitcoin total block
6
TABLE III. EVALUATION II POOL PARAMETERS
Slush pool Λ1 4040 PH/sec
f1 2%
ViaBTC Λ2 3090 PH/sec
f2 2%
KanoPool Λ3 48 PH/sec
f3 0.9%
0.00002 0.00004 0.00006 0.00008 0.00010
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Fig. 2. Large-scale miner on Bitcoin pools.
reward R = $45441 6. The pool parameters are shown in Table
III and the resulting diversification graph in Figure 2, where
we observe a similar pattern to the previous “representative”
pools example (i.e. a miner’s preference for larger pools and
steadier income as ρ increases).
3) Diversifying on a PPS Pool: In the previous evaluation
we showed that a PPS pool would not participate in the
diversification using parameters for actual pools shown in
Table III and typical values for ρ. In Figure 4 we show how a
PPS pool would affect a miner’s diversification for non-typical
large values of ρ, using the parameters in Table IV. This would
be applicable only for a miner who is very risk-averse, as he
would show a stronger preference to the steady income a PPS
pool provides, as the value of ρ increases.
4) Small-scale miners: An interesting observation is in
regards of smaller scale miners and pools with higher fees. For
instance, an active miner with 10 ASICs instead of 100, when
following our method, would allocate all his hash power to the
smaller pool (KanoPool) with the lowest fee. In Figure 3 we
show a small-scale (or “home”) Bitcoin miner as an example
(λA = 125 TH/sec). Given his relatively small hashpower, he
would only choose the lowest-fee pool to mine (KanoPool),
0.00002 0.00004 0.00006 0.00008 0.00010
CARA
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
H
as
h
ra
te
×1014
Slush Pool
ViaBTC
KanoPool
Solo BTC
Fig. 3. Small-scale miner on Bitcoin pools, parameters as in Table III.
6Parameters as of Jan 25 2019, retrieved from https://btc.com/ and
https://bitinfocharts.com/.
TABLE IV. BITCOIN POOL PARAMETERS INCLUDING PPS POOL
Slush pool Λ1 4040 PH/sec
f1 2%
ViaBTC Λ2 3090 PH/sec
f2 2%
KanoPool Λ3 48 PH/sec
f3 0.9%
PPS Pool f4 4%
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Fig. 4. Single currency with PPS pool and large values of ρ.
without allocating any resources to larger pools with higher
fees, except for the upper values of ρ. Essentially, it is shown
that risk-aversion has less effect on small-scale miners.
B. Multiple Cryptocurrencies
We now consider a miner who diversifies over different
cryptocurrencies. For simplicity, we just switch7 the currency
in the 2nd pool (ViaBTC) from Bitcoin to Bitcoin Cash. The
pool parameters are shown in Table V, ΛBTC = 42.33 EH/sec,
ΛBCH = 1.43 EH/sec and RBCH = $1547
6. The resulting graph
in Figure 5 show the diversification of his computational power
for various values of ρ. We observe that in this instance, for
small values of ρ his optimal strategy would be to keep most
of his resources for zero-fee Bitcoin solo mining. However, for
increasing values of ρ he would diversify his power to larger
pools, and he would also choose to allocate some of his power
to the Bitcoin Cash pool, even though it has the same fee and
the pool might not be as profitable as the Bitcoin pool.
Impact of Exchange Rates: We noted that our results are
highly sensitive even to very small changes to any of the
parameters, such as the exchange rates. For instance, the same
miner having chosen the same pools, based on the historical
data, would allocate all of his power to the Bitcoin Cash pool
the previous day, while after a few days he would transfer
all of his power to the Bitcoin pools. In Figures 6(a) and
6(b) we show how small daily fluctuations in the exchange
rate between two same-PoW cryptocurrencies can affect the
miner’s diversification for these cryptocurrencies. While in
our previous instantiation the exchange rate was BTC/BCH
= 0.034, a small increase in favor of Bitcoin Cash’s value
totally eliminates the presence of Bitcoin pools from the
diversification, leaving only the Bitcoin Cash pool and Bitcoin
Cash solo mining for the miner as his options. On the other
hand, a small increase in favor of Bitcoin’s value eliminates
the presence of the Bitcoin Cash pool, and the miner would
only diversify among the Bitcoin pools.
7Many pools as shown in the Appendix host pool mining services for
multiple cryptocurrencies.
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TABLE V. MULTI-CURRENCY POOL PARAMETERS
Slush pool Λ1 4040 PH/sec
f1 2%
ViaBTC Λ2 135 PH/sec
(Bitcoin Cash) f2 2%
KanoPool Λ3 48 PH/sec
f3 0.9%
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Fig. 5. Large-scale miner on SHA-256 pools.
V. EVALUATION AND SIMULATED RESULTS
To showcase the advantage (and risks) of diversifying over
multiple pools, we present an evaluation of our model using
Bitcoin data extracted from Smartbit Block Explorer API [21],
as shown in Table VI. First, we consider a Bitcoin miner
owning some hashing power λA = 1200TH/sec, who would
start mining passively on a single chosen pool on February 1st
2018 for ∆ = 4 months. Then, we consider a Bitcoin miner
having the same hashing power λA, who using our tool over the
same time period, would “actively” diversify every t = 3 days
over M = 3 Bitcoin pools of his choosing and reallocate his
hashpower accordingly. In Table VII we outline the mining
pools chosen for our evaluation along with their respective
fees and other simulation parameters. We choose these pools
as representatives of different pool sizes and fees, and to show
how such pools influence the active miner’s diversification over
time. As discussed in Section IV, we pick the mean value for
ρ = 0.00005. Note that as we mentioned in the introductory
section, all of the above parameters constitute several degrees
of freedom in our experiments. In the subsequent sections we
show how each one of them can affect the end result derived
from our main evaluation.
We retroactively compute the earnings on a daily basis
for both miners. To take both overall reward and miner’s
income variance into account, we utilize the Sharpe ratio
S = P−PPPS
σ∆
as our main comparison metric, where P is the
total accumulated reward of the miner during the time period
∆, PPPS is the estimated miner’s reward during time period ∆
using a PPS pool8 and σ∆ stands for the Standard Deviation
of miner’s reward over the time period ∆.
Remark. Here we should note that while the CARA utility
function is used to capture preferences over different wealth
levels, one could argue that the miner should be amortizing
his costs and revenue over a time period, since the average
payoff per block would have little variance and a diversification
over multiple pools is not necessary. However the sum (or the
8We approximate PPPS using a large Bitcoin pool which offers a relatively
steady income, and subtract fPPS from those rewards.
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(a) BTC/BCH = 0.033.
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Fig. 6. Large-scale miner on SHA-256 pools, parameters in Table V
discount rate weighted sum) of many Poisson variables linearly
scales both the mean and variance of each single Poisson
variable, so our analysis, which apparently looks like “to
evaluate the reward from a single block”, is indeed equivalent
to capturing preferences over different wealth levels (this trap
is a common “fallacy of large numbers” [22], [23]).
A. Evaluation Assumptions
We assume that both miners choose pools that do not use
the PPS reward scheme and that all pool’s fees and reward
schemes remain constant over time. In addition, the miners
are assumed to have constant hashpower (i.e. do not use any
of their rewards to buy more mining hardware), and convert
their rewards into USD on a daily basis. For our analysis, we
derive the daily network hashrate Λd from the daily network
difficulty Td using the approximation Λd =
232
600Td. We also
approximate the daily pool hashpower by Λm,d =
Bm,d
Bd
where
Bm,d the number of blocks found by pool m and Bd the total
actual number of blocks found on each day d. The smaller
the mining pool however, the less precise this approximation
becomes (i.e. a small pool might be “unlucky” and would not
find a block for several consecutive days, while on some day it
might become “lucky” and find several blocks in a single day),
so we employ averaging techniques over a time window of 14
days (which we believe is a reasonable period) to improve
our approximation accuracy for computing Λm,d. However a
miner in the “real world” would better use the self-reporting
pool hashrates (based on submitted shares) for a more precise
result (to our knowledge, such historical data is not available
on any block explorer). Also as noted before, we do not take
any transaction fees kept by pools into account for simplicity
purposes. However, a miner can use the methodology in
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TABLE VI. DATA FROM BITCOIN BLOCKCHAIN.
Days ∈ ∆ d
Exchange rate Ed
Network difficulty Td
Participating pools md
Total number of blocks Bd
Number of blocks found by pool m Bm,d
TABLE VII. SIMULATION PARAMETERS
Miners’ hashpower λA 1200TH/sec
Diversification interval t 3 days
Fee fSlushPool 2%
Fee fViaBTC 2%
Fee fDPOOL 1%
CARA ρ 0.00005
Section III-E to compute the average transaction fees over a
recent period of time from online blockchain explorers and
make a projection for fees in the future, then add txm,c and
txc to Equation 7 accordingly. Finally, we show the earnings in
USD instead of cryptocurrency (Bitcoins) in order to take the
exchange rate into account, which is an important parameter
for the active miner (used to calculate the block reward R).
B. Main Evaluation Results
In Figure 7 we show the earnings over time for both
of the miners for comparison (in Figure 7(b) we also show
how the diversification changes over time in light colors).
We observe a slightly increased variance for the active miner
(blue line spikes), since he chose to include a third pool
(DPOOL) with smaller total hashpower Λ. However his total
accumulated reward would be PA = $101221 for the active
miner, compared to PP = $97101, which eventually leads to a
Sharpe ratio SA = 0.156 compared to SP = 0.060. Note that
since we assumed both miners’ hashpower λA remains constant
throughout this period, we observe a general decline pattern
in their daily reward, because of the increasing difficulty T
directly affecting λAΛ . We also include an equivalent analysis
using the same pools over an one year period in the next
evaluation, where such a decline can be observed more clearly.
Lastly, an important parameter to consider is the block time
D [24]. We used Bitcoin for our simulation, where D is
relatively high (roughly 10 minutes) - this resulted in high
reward variance, especially when using smaller pools as shown
in Figures 7 and 8. If we used a cryptocurrency with more
frequent blocks for our evaluation (e.g. Ethereum), then the
result would be more predictable with lower observed overall
variance values.
C. Analysis for a Large ∆
In Figure 8 we repeat the simulation discussed in Section
V-B over the period of ∆ = 1 year (January 1 2018 - December
31 2018). The decline of miner rewards due to the increasing
difficulty can be observed more clearly. In such a case, a miner
would most likely reinvest his earnings on mining hardware
to keep λAΛ as steady as possible. We also observe high
variance around January 2018, generated by the high volatility
in the Bitcoin/USD exchange rate EBTC. The results for this
evaluation are PA = $233293 and SA = 0.064 vs. PP = $224293
and SP = 0.023, which are consistent with the results derived
from the 4-month simulation.
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(a) Passive miner on Slush pool.
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Fig. 7. Hash power distribution over 4 month data
D. Analysis for a Different ∆ and Different Pools
We now replace the third small pool (DPOOL) from our
default set of pools with a larger one (AntPool) and set our
period from (January 1 2018 - June 30 2018) for∆ = 6 months,
thus diversifying over the three largest PPLNS pools during
that period. Again we observe an improvement in our metrics,
PA = $172719 and SA = 0.041 vs. PP = $172092 and SP =
0.032. Detailed analysis shown in Figure 9.
E. Analysis for Different Values of ρ
We now repeat our retroactive analysis discussed in Section
V-B by setting ρ = 0.0001, which is at the upper bound of
our considered typical values. By comparing Figure 10 with
Figure 7(b), we observe that the miner chose to diversify on
the smaller pool (DPOOL) less frequently, since he is more
“sensitive” to risk. As expected, this translates to a lower-
variance graph and a more steady income. However his overall
reward decreases, which offsets the previous benefit. Having
kept the rest of the analysis parameters to our original default
values, the miner’s total accumulated reward would be now PA
= $99082, and the Sharpe ratio would be SA = 0.104.
By further experimenting with a broader value range for ρ,
we derive Figure 11, where we observe a decreasing trend for
the Sharpe ratio as ρ increases. This may be counterintuitive
at first sight, as traditional portfolio theory would otherwise
predict a flat relationship between a strategys Sharpe ratio
and an investors risk aversion. The reason for this difference
is that our model captures any potential impact of a miner’s
decisions to the whole equilibrium. If the miner is relatively
small, his effect on the equilibrium is negligible through first-
order Taylor expansion. In this case however, the miner is so
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(a) Passive miner on Slush pool.
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Fig. 8. Hash power distribution over 1 year data
large that his power is comparable to the third pool (DPOOL),
and his effect on the whole equilibrium is no longer negligible,
leading to the declining graph. If we replace DPOOL with a
larger pool (Antpool) as shown in Figure 12, we observe that
the chosen ρ has eventually no effect on the Sharpe ratio.
F. Analysis for Different Values of Miner Power
By repeating our main evaluation for several different
values of miner’s computational power, we derive Figure 13
where we observe a negative correlation between Sharpe ratio
and a miner’s hash rates. As in the previous case, if the miner
is large enough compared to the pools, our model captures his
effect on the whole equilibrium which is negligible in typical
portfolio analyses. When we replace the small pool (DPOOL)
with a larger one (Antpool) and repeat our experiment, the
traditional insight from portfolio theory reemerges: As shown
in Figure 14, for a relatively small miner, we now observe no
significant correlation with miner hash rate and the resulting
Sharpe ratio.
G. Analysis for Different Diversification Intervals
While our main evaluation assumed the active miner runs
our tool every 3 days, in Figure 15 we show how different
diversification intervals affect the Sharpe ratio. The general
observation is that small intervals (less than 1 week) help
slightly to improve the results, while large intervals (more
than 1 month) are generally not recommended. After all, if
the time period of hashpower reallocation becomes very large,
the miner is not very “active” and his behavior matches more
that of a passive miner.
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Fig. 9. Hash power distribution over 6 months data and different pool set.
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Fig. 10. Active miner diversifying over Bitcoin pools with increased ρ =
0.0001.
H. Analysis for Different Number of Available Pools
In Figure 16 we examine how our main evaluation metrics
are affected both by the total number and the specific pools
available to the miner. We observe that if the miner only
picks one pool (e.g. ViaBTC), effectively he can only diversify
between that pool and solo mining, which usually matches a
passive miner for a typical value of ρ. However, as the miner
includes additional pools into his consideration, his Sharpe
ratio tends to increase, which indicates that a rational miner
should consider as many pools as possible. However, given
that we performed a retroactive analysis, adding “bad luck”
pools into the miner’s available pool set does not improve his
Sharpe ratio any further.
I. Analysis for Different Cryptocurrencies
As discussed in Section III-C, our model also considers
miners who diversify over multiple cryptocurrencies which use
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the same PoW algorithm. Extending our evaluation results to
such a case is relatively straightforward (assuming the equiv-
alent data shown in Table VI are available for all considered
cryptocurrencies) and we expect a similar derivation of results,
as the only additional parameter in the problem is the reward
over time ratio Rc
Dc
, normalized to each cryptocurrency’s total
hashrate Λc, and a “passive” miner would just choose the
most beneficial pool/cryptocurrency in the beginning of the
experiment, without however taking any future changes of the
above parameters into account.
We also note that the case of diversifying over different
cryptocurrencies which also employ different PoW algorithms
as discussed in Section III-D is hard to execute in practice,
since as discussed it excludes ASIC hardware, while it requires
fine-tuning process priorities in CPUs and GPUs.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We present an analytical tool that allows risk-averse miners
to optimally create a mining portfolio that maximizes their
risk-adjusted rewards, using a theoretical model that optimally
allocates miner’s resources over mining pools based on their
risk aversion levels. We provide multiple extensions of the base
model to enable miners to optimally distribute their power
between mining pools of different cryptocurrencies, which
might even use different PoW algorithms. Then, we develop
an analytical tool publicly available (as provided in Section
IV) for miners to compute their optimal hash power allocation
based on their inputs, and we present both time-static and
historical-retroactive evaluations of our tool. The retroactive
evaluation results show a direct benefit for the individual miner
in terms of reward amount over reward standard deviation ratio
(expressed by the Sharpe ratio).
As a final note, it is often argued that the massive partic-
ipation on mining pools has lead to blockchain centralization
(e.g. in bitcoin at the time of writing, over 50% of mining
is done by 4 mining pools). Lack of decentralization can
lead to various types of attacks, including double-spending,
reversing confirmations of previous transactions or transaction
censoring [25], [26], [27], [28]. Mining pools (especially
mining pools of larger sizes) have been criticized for lead-
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ing to a high rate of centralization. A number of academic
works have studied the level and concerning effects of the
centralization trend [2], [24], [28] while a number of solutions
have been proposed spanning from decentralized mining pools
(P2Pool [29] for Bitcoin), to alternative, non-outsourceable
PoW mechanisms [30]. We believe that tools like the one we
present here, are positive steps towards the “centralization”
problem of PoW systems. Our tool provides incentives to
miners in order for them to actively diversify among different
pools and cryptocurrencies, potentially increasing power of a
large number of smaller pools, while at the same time could
also provide insights to mining pool managers in terms of how
would rational miners behave.
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APPENDIX A
MINING POOLS FOR MAJOR CRYPTOCURRENCIES
In Table VIII we summarize a list of mining pools for
major cryptocurrencies and the reward type each offers, as of
February 15 2019. PPS, PPLNS and proportional we already
discussed in Section II-B. In the following table we also
come across some variants of the standard reward types. In
particular, FPPS (Full Pay Per Share) is similar to PPS but
payments take average transaction fees into account, Score is
based on the proportional reward method weighed by time
the share was submitted, and Exponential is a PPLNS variant
with exponential decay of share values. We manually collected
the data using the respective mining pool websites and the
cryptocurrencies’ block explorers.
TABLE VIII. MINING POOLS FOR MAJOR CRYPTOCURRENCIES
Pool Name Coin Reward type Hash power
BTC.com BTC FPPS 8.13 EH/s
BCH FPPS 207.97 PH/s
Antpool BTC PPLNS,PPS 5.06 EH/s
BCH PPLNS,PPS 149.48 PH/s
ETH PPLNS,PPS 323 GH/s
LTC PPLNS,PPS 21.2 TH/s
ETC PPLNS,PPS 6.26 GH/s
ZEC PPLNS,PPS 258 MSol/s
DASH PPLNS,PPS 138 TH/S
SIA PPLNS,PPS 816.92 TH/s
Slush BTC Score 3.27 EH/s
ViaBTC BTC PPLNS,PPS 2.87 EH/s
BCH PPLNS,PPS 84.49 PH/s
ETH PPLNS,PPS 878 GH/s
LTC PPLNS,PPS 26.52 TH/s
ETC PPLNS,PPS 6.032 GH/s
ZEC PPLNS,PPS 89.63 MSol/s
DASH PPLNS,PPS 117.36 TH/s
Miningpoolhub ETH PPLNS 8.33 TH/s
LTC PPLNS 277 GH/s
ETC PPLNS 1.494 TH/s
ZEC PPLNS 29.378 MH/s
DASH PPLNS 27.69 TH/s
XMR PPLNS 5.74 MH/s
DGB PPLNS 11.85 TH/s
Bitcoin.com BTC PPS 892.16 PH/s
BCH PPS 191.72 PH/s
Nanopool ETH PPLNS 20.96 TH/s
ETC PPLNS 1.65 TH/s
ZEC PPLNS 53.57 MSol/s
GRIN PPLNS 17.1 Kgp/s
XMR PPLNS 57.488 MH/s
Litecoinpool.org LTC PPS 33.49 TH/s
Ethermine ETH PPLNS 41.4 TH/s
ETC PPLNS 3.5 TH/s
ZEC PPLNS 396.9 MSol/s
f2pool BTC PPS 4.46 EH/s
ETH PPS 17.7 TH/s
LTC PPS 40.94 TH/s
ETC PPS 127.37 GH/s
ZEC PPS 379.73 MSol/s
DASH PPS 74.44 TH/s
SIA PPS 3.59 TH/s
XMR PPS 54.50 MH/s
Multipool BTC Exponential 0.66 PH/s
BCH PPLNS 3.658 PH/s
LTC PPLNS 122.22 GH/s
DGB Proportional 3.836 PH/s
Minergate BTG PPLNS,PPS 2.006 KSol/s
ETH PPLNS 14.68 GH/s
ETC PPLNS 4.374 GH/s
ZEC PPLNS 16.12 KSol/s
XMR PPLNS,PPS 3.776 MH/s
BCN PPLNS,PPS 1.641 MH/s
Suprnova BTG Proportional 0.25 MSol/s
LTC Proportional 24.09 GH/
ZEC Proportional 19.03 KSol/s
DGB Proportional 9.45 TH/s
DASH Proportional 9.26 TH/s
Coinotron ETH PPLNS,RBPPS 806.6 GH/s
LTC PPLNS,PPS 37.8 GH/s
ETC PPLNS,RBPPS 53.8 GH/s
ZEC PPLNS,PPS 491.5 MSol/s
BTG PPLNS,PPS 332.6 KH/s
DASH PPLNS,PPS 2.4 TH/s
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